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BOOK REVIEW
Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections. By WILLIAM
A. JORDAN. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
Pp. 340. $12.00.
The term public utility brings to mind gas, electric or natural monopolies.
Government regulation in these public utilities is accepted without question
because such monopolies require protection for the consumer. Transpor-
tation is also a public utility, but at least in the case of intercity and
interstate transportation, it is not a natural monopoly. In both railroad
and air transportation there is competition between carriers. Neverthe-
less, without the protection of the government, the private citizen would
be at the mercy of the industry. There is no better illustration of this
fact than the railroad industry. The Interstate Commerce Commission
was founded for the specific purpose of doing away with special rates,
rebates, special pricing, unfiled tariffs, tariffs which were not observed
when they were filed, and other practices which not only discriminated
against members of the public, but which, in many instances, determined
whether or not a citizen could stay in business. The midwest farmer was
particularly dependent upon the railroad, and the Grange Movement was
one of the leaders in the demand for railroad regulation.'
In the 1930's, regulation of commercial airlines was first considered.
There was some talk of a need to prevent the practices that had led to
regulation in the railroad industry a half century earlier. In fact, however,
the situation in the airline industry was entirely different. The airlines
were not yet a major form of transportation, and the hauling of freight by
air was almost non-existent. Instead of protection of the public from the
airline industry, the leading proponents of airline regulation were the air-
lines themselves. The major demands for regulation came from airlines
with government mail contracts, which were already subject to some gov-
ernmental control; the demands for regulation were directed against the
airlines without airmail contracts, which were subject to no control what-
soever. 2 Nevertheless, the stated purpose of the Civil Aeronautics Act
was the protection of the public.3
1. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931); Atchinson,
The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act, 1887-1937, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
289 (1937); Rosenfield, A Case for the Legality of Youth Standby and Young
Adult Airline Fares, 36 J. OF AIR L. & CoM. 615, 646 (1970).
2. RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED (1939); THOMAS, ECo-
NOMIC REGULATION OF SCHEDULED Am TRANSPORT (1951); Jones, Anti-Trust and
Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Comparative Analysis, 19 ABA
ANTI-TRUST Section 261 (1961).
3. 72 STAT. 740, § 102.
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Today, the airlines have grown up and are a major factor in the trans-
portation of both persons and freight. The Civil Aeronautics Board(hereinafter referred to as the C.A.B.) regulates commercial aviation.
This regulation relates to entry, exit, service and price, and is little short
of total. Protection of the public by insurance of the best possible service
and lowest possible price is more important today than at any time during
which the airlines have been regulated. Yet, today we read more and
more of expansion of routes to the point where some routes have five or
six competing carriers, or even more; while at the same time we are read-
ing about financial losses being suffered by almost all of the airlines, fol-
lowed by demands for higher fares. In fact, the C.A.B. is today in the
midst of an examination of the whole fare structure in the airlines.4 The
question being asked today is whether the complete regulation of the
C.A.B. has, in fact, benefitted the general public. Is the C.A.B. ac-
complishing the desired result? Increasingly, total regulation is under
scrutiny. Increasingly, a new look is being demanded at regulation in the
airline industry. There is a searching for some satisfactory alternative to
the failures being pointed out in the present regulation.
As one of those concerned with the aviation industry and as one not
satisfied with the results achieved by the C.A.B., I looked with particular
anticipation to Airline Regulation in America because it is a study of the
effect of regulation in the airline industry. Professor Jordan hypothesizes
that: 1.) regulation protects the consumer from the producer; 2.) regu-
lation has no significant effect on regulated industry; or 3.) regulation
protects the producers by helping them to form a cartel to obtain monopoly
benefits. Professor Jordan concludes that the third hypothesis, the cartel
hypothesis, is most applicable in the regulation of aviation. He contends
that regulation by the C.A.B. has actually acted to protect airline inef-
ficiency and that less regulation would lead to greater public benefit.
The method of analysis used is a comparison of the certificated trunk
airlines, those operating in interstate transportation, and therefore, subject
to regulation by the C.A.B., with the intrastate California carriers which
are not subject to C.A.B. regulation but only to regulation by the state of
California. The period of study is 1946-1965, a period during which the
California Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
P.U.C.), the regulatory agency for California carriers, exercised control
over increase in fares but not over entry, exit or the lowering of fares.
While Professor Jordan concludes that his third (cartel) hypothesis
most closely describes the commercial airlines subject to C.A.B. regula-
tion, he also attempts to show that, based on the California experience, the
lack of regulation would provide greater benefit for the general public
than is presently provided by the regulation of the C.A.B. I have no
quarrel with Professor Jordan in regard to the effect of regulation by the
C.A.B. If he simply stopped at this point, his thesis would be supported
even though I would see little value in stopping at this point. He would
simply be presenting the problem, and the problem is obvious to anyone
4. Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, Docket 21866, Order 70-1-147,
Jan. 29, 1970.
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who has looked, and could be made obvious to those who have not looked,
in far fewer than the 244 pages utilized by this book. But Professor Jordan
does not simply rest upon his hypothetical thesis. He argues that the
lesser regulation provided by the P.U.C. would be of greater value to
society. It is with this conclusion that I have difficulty. It is not that I
disagree; it is that I do not believe the evidence presented tends to bear
out the thesis that minimal regulation would be to the general benefit.
Actually, the study tends to show that regulation of a greater nature than
that exercised by P.U.C. is necessary, although regulation to the extent
exercised by the C.A.B. may not be desirable.
Let me illustrate with three examples from this study. The first relates
to entry into and exit from the field of commercial aviation. It is noted
that there were 16 trunk carriers in 1946, at the beginning of this study,
and that this total dwindled to 11 by 1965. No new trunks were certifi-
cated by the C.A.B., and all five exiting were merged into existing car-
riers. This is in contrast to the total of 16 different intra-state carriers
that operated at some time during this period in California. However, the
California total was in a constant state of flux. In 1946, there was only
one carrier in existence. There were seven in 1949 and three in 1965.
At the end of 1965, only one remained in existence. From this compari-
son, Professor Jordan concludes that except for the C.A.B. there would
be a substantially larger number of trunk carriers.
Undoubtedly, without C.A.B. regulation there would have been more
entries. One need only look at the figures to note that the C.A.B. has
certificated no trunk carriers except those certificated under the Grand-
father Clause when regulation was first enacted in 1938.5 But no great
benefit is shown from entry alone. We are interested in the public, and
the next question to be asked is what will the effect of unlimited entry be?
If California is used as a measuring stick, it provides a large number of
entries, but also a large number of exits. It is not explained how the pub-
lic will benefit from a large and ever changing number of weak carriers,
each of whom will be forced to exit at the first economic crisis.
A second comparison Professor Jordan makes is in the fare structure
in three major California markets. The markets studied are Los Angeles-
San Francisco, Los Angeles-San Diego and San Francisco-San Diego. In
these markets, first class service was offered only by the certificated car-
riers, and during the period under study these fares rose steadily without
fluctuation, the increase amounting to approximately 87.8%. Coach
fares, where there was competition between the certificated carrier and the
California intrastate carrier, fluctuated, with an overall increase of only
35%. Thus, the author concluded that without substantial competition
from the intrastate carrier, the interstate coach fares would have in-
creased as much as the first class fares, though the consumer would have
received no more service. 6 This is undoubtedly true, but again, if it is the
consumer with whom we are concerned, it is necessary to go further to
see what result would occur if the trunk airlines were subject to the same
5. CAvES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATIONS 169 (1962).
6. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 92 (1970).
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control as the intrastate carriers. Initially, competition would reduce the
fares as in California, but what will the effect be when free entry and exit
has reduced the total number of carriers to one or two? Can it be said
that the remaining one or two carriers will continue to provide lower fares
than those of the trunks? No evidence is presented on this. If there is
one unregulated carrier left, why can it not now set any rate it desires?
If more than one carrier remains, is there any reason to believe that one
of the two following causes will not be followed? (1) Agreement among
the remaining unregulated carriers on fare level, i.e., Professor Jordan's
cartel theory, but without the regulation of the C.A.B.; or (2) fare war
until there is only one survivor, who is again free to set fares at any desired
level. Certainly it is difficult to see any advantage in this situation for
the public.
The final example I would like to note refers to markets served. With-
out regulations a carrier is free to pick only the most lucrative routes and
to avoid the disadvantages of the less desirable routes. Professor Jordan
concedes that the California carriers did to some extent "skim the cream,"
that is, limit operations to the most desirable routes. He offers as evi-
dence that this is not really true, and that unregulated carriers will volun-
tarily serve minor as well as major markets, the fact that the California
carriers during the period studied served a total of 40 California markets.
He concedes, however, that service on 32 of those 40 routes was very brief
a matter of a few months, and in some cases even less. 7
An excellent example of the fact that the California experience tends
to support the "skim the cream" theory and does not necessarily operate in
the best public interest is Pacific Southwest Airlines, the one California
intrastate carrier that survived the period studied. It entered the market
in 1949, and while it did serve Long Beach and San Jose for short periods,
other than these brief periods, its service was limited to Los Angeles-San
Diego and San Francisco-San Diego. These three routes are respectively
the 1st, 9th and 23rd busiest routes in the United States.8 All unques-
tionably lucrative routes. Even as late as 1969, the only routes added to
this network have been Long Beach, San Jose and Sacramento, all major
cities.9 Yet, by 1969, while still an intrastate carrier, Pacific Southwest
Airlines had become one of the ten largest airlines in the United States.10
While lack of regulation may provide service for the public in the largest
cities, there is certainly no showing that airline service in California to the
smaller markets has been improved by the lack of regulations.
In the above examples, as well as the other areas studied by Professor
Jordan, the figures tend to show that regulation of the airline industry by
the C.A.B. has benefitted the existing airlines, but it completely fails to
show that minimal regulation as practiced in the P.U.C. necessarily bene-
fits the public.
7. Supra note 6, at 258-59.
8. Supra note 6, at 237.
9. Esso AIR WORLD (Nov./Dec. 1969).
10. Id.
[Vol. XX
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I have difficulty trying to determine whether Professor Jordan is recom-
mending the minimal regulation as practiced by the P.U.C. during the
period studied, in which case I cannot agree with his conclusions, or
whether he is simply content to show that the activity taking place within
the C.A.B. regulation fits into his preconceived definition. If this is his
conclusion, then my reaction is-so what? Rather than the conclusion, I
would consider this the beginning. The point from which we would pro-
ceed to find the combinations which will improve the regulation by
government and maximize the benefits to the public.
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